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Health Law
Vaccine Mandates and Religion
Dorit Reiss1
Introduction
This chapter addresses the issue of whether, in light of the
Supreme Court’s recent cases on religious freedom, vaccine
mandates without religious exemptions are constitutional.
The issue is of timely importance for two reasons. First, since
2015, four states—California, Maine, New York, and Connecticut
(given in chronological order)—have removed the non-medical
exemption from their school immunization mandate. If a religious
exemption from school vaccine mandates is constitutionally
required, these states are in violation.
Second, the Court has showed a recent solicitude for claims
of religious freedom. In 1990, in Employment Division v. Smith,
the Court held that a generally applicable, facially neutral law
need not provide a religious exemption.2 But since 2014, the
Supreme Court has gradually expanded the protection of free
exercise of religion. Since October 2020, that pace has quickened.
On September 18, 2020, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg died, and,
in October, Justice Amy Coney Barrett was confirmed in her
place. On November 25, 2020, the Supreme Court ruled on the
first of a series of cases finding restrictions on houses of worship
unconstitutional. The decision, Roman Catholic Diocese v.
Cuomo,3 emphasized the importance of religious freedom and was
based on the view that restrictions specific to houses of worship
must withstand strict scrutiny. The Court granted an emergency
stay of the restrictions, and although the case was decided per
curiam, the separate opinions make clear that Justice Barrett was
the deciding vote for the stay. Stays in previous, similar cases were
often denied in 5–4 decisions the other way.
1

Excerpted and adapted from Dorit Reiss, Vaccine Mandates and
Religion: Where are We Headed With the Supreme Court?, 49 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 552 (2021).
2
494 U.S. 872, 875–78 (1990).
3
141 S. Ct. 63 (2020).
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Cuomo was followed by several other shadow-docket cases,
most notably Tandon v. Newsom, where the Court struck down a
restriction on in-home gatherings, for religious reasons or not, as
violating religious freedom based on the fact that secular
business—like stores—were not subject to the same limitations.4
Observers read Tandon and other decisions as not just
strengthening protection of religious freedom but also carving out
a large exception to Smith: any secular exception from a rule
means that Smith does not apply and subjects the lack of a
religious exemption to strict scrutiny.
Shortly after Tandon, the Supreme Court decided a case that
could have dramatically changed the First Amendment discussion.
In Fulton v. City of Philadelphia,5 the Court confronted the
question of whether the City of Philadelphia’s choice to terminate
a contract with a Catholic adoption agency because the agency
refused to certify same-sex couples as foster parents violated the
First Amendment. During the case, the Court considered
overruling Smith. Although the Court declined to do so, finding,
instead, that Smith did not apply because the failure of the city to
apply an existing discretionary exemption to allow the agency’s
religious objection violated strict scrutiny, three justices—Justices
Alito, Gorsuch, and Thomas—would have overturned Smith.
These developments raise questions for vaccine mandates
without religious exemptions. Although courts had, since Smith,
consistently ruled that the First Amendment does not require
vaccine mandates to have a religious exemption, the combination
of the shadow-docket cases and Fulton now has opened the door
to reconsidering whether vaccine mandates must offer a religious
exemption. Because vaccines mandates are always accompanied
by a medical exemption for those who cannot safely be given a
specific vaccine, is the provision of a medical exemption but the
disallowance of a religious exemption consistent with the First
Amendment?
In 2021, the Supreme Court denied a stay in two cases where
a COVID-19 vaccine mandate did not offer a religious
exemption.6 But these cases do not resolve the question. Both
4

141 S. Ct. 1294, 1294–99 (2021) (per curiam).
141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
6
Does v. Mills, 142 S. Ct. 17 (2021); Dr. A. v. Hochul, 142 S. Ct. 522
(2021).
5
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cases focused on whether to grant an emergency stay, rather than
a ruling on the merits. And in one of them, Doe v. Mills, Justice
Barrett, joined by Justice Kavanaugh, concurred to emphasize that
fact. Justice Barrett worried that granting emergency relief would
encourage applicants to
use the emergency docket to force the Court to give a merits
preview in cases that it would be unlikely to take—and to do so
on a short fuse without benefit of full briefing and oral
argument. In my view, this discretionary consideration counsels
against a grant of extraordinary relief in this case, which is the
first to address the questions presented.7

Thus, whether a religious exemption to vaccine mandates is
constitutionally required is an open question.
This chapter argues that, for children, a religious exemption is
not required. Nor should a religious exemption generally be
required for adults, though there may be exceptions. I will address
children first, then adults.
The case for requiring a religious exemption is weakest when
it comes to children because child-focused vaccine mandates sit
on especially strong legal ground, drawing on state police powers
to act in the public health and on the limits on parental rights to
act against the child’s welfare. Unvaccinated children are
themselves at risk, left at higher risk of contracting a dangerous
preventable disease than their peers, and risk others because they
can infect others with a transmissible disease. Religious freedoms
are also at their weakest when invoked on behalf of a child—who
cannot yet choose religion themself—and when used to impose a
health risk on others. In other words, a parent’s right to allow the
child to be harmed or die is limited because the child has health
rights too, and a parent’s right to create a risk for the child’s
classmates is even more limited.
Further, even if the Supreme Court were poised to overruled
Smith, cases dating long before Smith have upheld school vaccine
mandates without a religious exemption. Some have even found
that such mandates survive strict scrutiny because protecting
children’s health is a compelling interest, and there is no

7

Mills, 142 S. Ct. at 18 (Barrett, J., concurring).
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alternative that would provide the level of protection that school
mandates without a religious exemption provide.
In the 1944 case Prince v. Massachusetts, a case upholding
the prosecution of a guardian for violating child-labor laws by
allowing her niece to help distribute religious pamphlets
promoting Jehovah Witnesses’ beliefs, the Supreme Court ruled
that even the combination of parental rights and religious freedom
does not prevent the state from regulating to protect child welfare.
A parent’s religious freedom cannot be used to put a child at risk.
In dictum, the Court stated that the same reasoning applies to
compulsory child vaccination, because “[t]he right to practice
religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community
or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or
death.”8 Prince has been cited repeatedly in cases rejecting Free
Exercise Clause challenges to school immunization mandates,
before and after Smith.
Children’s vaccine mandates without a religious exemptions
are on very strong grounds because they vindicate three important
interests. The first is the rights of the child, who is too young to
make their own religious decisions, and for whom—in almost
every case—the risks of vaccinating are substantially smaller than
risks of not vaccinating. The second is the rights of other children
in the school for a safe environment (and of their parents to send
their children into a safe environment). And the third is the
community’s interest in public health, which can be negatively
affected by outbreaks. Parents who do not want to vaccinate their
school-age children due to their own religious beliefs infringe all
three interests. Courts have not been sympathetic to that position.
For adults, the case for vaccinate mandates without religious
exemptions is weaker because adults are acting according to their
own religious beliefs, and the tension between public health and
religious freedom is more direct because the impact is on the
believer directly. Nonetheless, even were the Court to overturn
Smith, vaccine mandates without religious exemptions should
continue to be held to a rational-basis standard, not strict scrutiny.
That is so for three reasons.
First, on policy grounds, vaccine mandates are justified to
protect the public’s safety in an area where broad compliance is
needed to achieve the targeted goal of herd immunity.
8

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944).
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Unvaccinated individuals free ride on a public good—herd
immunity—while refusing to contribute to it. And if enough
individuals refuse to be vaccinated, they can prevent herd
immunity for the community.
Second, the risk of abuse of vaccine-mandate exemptions—
i.e., using a religious exemption to support opposition that is not,
in fact, religiously based—is high. And preventing abuse—
policing the sincerity of claims of religious objections—is
challenging, if not impossible.
Third, as Justice Alito pointed out in his concurrence in
Fulton, applying rational basis is most appropriate under the First
Amendment when a general law is aimed at actions that pose a
substantial threat to public safety, peace, or order.9 Allowing
vaccine mandates with no religious exemptions fits that goal and
is consistent with original understandings of the First
Amendment.
Does the inclusion of medical exemptions require the
inclusion of religious exemptions? Several reasons suggest no.
First, medical exemptions are usually well defined and require
medical documentation; that is different than an undefined,
discretionary exemption of the type implicated in Fulton. Second,
under existing jurisprudence, a medical exemption is likely
constitutionally required; thus, legislatures are not choosing to
favor secular interests over religious interests. Finally, the logic of
medical exemptions fits the logic of the mandate: mandates say
that those who can be safely vaccinated should be. A medical
exemption leaves out those who cannot be safely vaccinated but
captures everyone else—achieving the mandate’s goal, rather than
creating an out.10
*

9

*

*

Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1902–04 (Alito, J., concurring).
For another discussion of this point, see Lindsay F. Wiley & Steve
Vladeck, Why Carefully Designed Vaccination Mandates Can—and
Should—Withstand Constitutional Challenge, LAWFARE BLOG (Aug. 12,
2021).
10
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